20 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 9967 | 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien] |
| 9968 | A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien] |
| 9965 | There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien] |
| 9966 | The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien] |
| 9963 | If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien] |
| 9962 | How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien] |
| 9964 | Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 9969 | The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| 8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
| 8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
| 8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |