12 ideas
| 14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
| 14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
| 14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
| 14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
| 4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn] |
| 4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn] |
| 8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
| 8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
| 8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
| 8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
| 14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |