Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Postscripts on supervenience', 'Meaning and Necessity' and 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism'

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11 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
14775 Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
13745 Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence [Kim]
13746 Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation [Kim]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
14774 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
14773 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
14772 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
14771 Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
14769 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
11968 The intension of a sentence is the set of all possible worlds in which it is true [Carnap, by Kaplan]