Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'Naming and Necessity preface' and 'Event Causation: counterfactual analysis'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett]
Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett]
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]