Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic' and 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


40 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
'2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber]
What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 4. Objectification
Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis]