Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses' and 'The Logic of What Might Have Been'

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42 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
14684 A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14669 For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
14667 System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N]
14668 In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N]
14692 System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14671 What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14686 S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N]
14691 S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N]
14693 The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
14670 Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
23634 Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14678 Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14680 Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14690 In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
14677 Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
14679 Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
14688 Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
14685 Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
14681 Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14676 Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
14689 Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
14674 Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
14682 Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
14687 Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
14683 Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14672 Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
14675 Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
14673 You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
23635 Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
7631 Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
23637 Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
23638 Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
23639 It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
6492 Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
23641 People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
23642 If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
23640 Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8430 Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8396 Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
8429 Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
8428 Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
4781 Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]