Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed)' and 'The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930'

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28 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher]
Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn]
Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha]
Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter]
'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter]
Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]