Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Paradoxes: Form and Predication', 'Contingent Identity' and 'Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare]