8 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
14235 | Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
22442 | If lies were ever acceptable, with would undermine all duties based on contract [Kant] |
22441 | The law will protect you if you tell a truth which results in murder [Kant] |