Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Habermas', 'Nature Without Essence' and 'Nominalism'

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19 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog]
Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog]
Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog]
Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
We don't condemn people for being bad at reasoning [Finlayson]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
One can universalise good advice, but that doesn't make it an obligation [Finlayson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The 'culture industry' is an advertisement for the way things are [Finlayson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog]
Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog]