16 ideas
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
10001 | An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase [Hofweber] |
10007 | Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities [Hofweber] |
9998 | What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols? [Hofweber] |
10002 | '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural [Hofweber] |
10003 | Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy? [Hofweber] |
10008 | Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential [Hofweber] |
10005 | Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects [Hofweber] |
10000 | We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers [Hofweber] |
10006 | First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics [Hofweber] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
10004 | Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects [Hofweber] |
15675 | We don't condemn people for being bad at reasoning [Finlayson] |
15674 | One can universalise good advice, but that doesn't make it an obligation [Finlayson] |
15662 | The 'culture industry' is an advertisement for the way things are [Finlayson] |