18 ideas
| 19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
| 19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
| 19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
| 19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
| 19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
| 19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
| 19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
| 22333 | Only language is understandable Being [Gadamer] |
| 19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
| 19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
| 6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
| 6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
| 6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
| 6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |
| 6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
| 6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
| 6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
| 20928 | Facts don't oppose values; they are integrated into each person's aspirations [Gadamer, by Zimmermann,J] |