Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Coherence Theory of Truth', 'Two Kinds of Possibility' and 'Truth-making and Correspondence'

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25 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18365 If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18362 Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18360 It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18358 Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
18355 What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18354 Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David]
18356 Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David]
18363 Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
19079 For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18364 Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
18359 One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David]
18357 What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19077 Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
19076 Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
19078 Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
19084 Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
19083 How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19075 Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
18361 A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
12205 There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
12207 Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12206 Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington]
12208 An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19074 Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
19082 Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]