Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Coherence Theory of Truth', 'The Case against Closure (and reply)' and 'later work'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
6840 Derrida came to believe in the undeconstructability of justice, which cannot be relativised [Derrida, by Critchley]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
19079 For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19076 Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
19077 Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
19078 Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
19084 Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
19083 How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19075 Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19544 Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
19545 We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
19547 Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
19546 Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
19548 The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
19549 P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
19550 We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19074 Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
19082 Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
21936 A community must consist of singular persons, with nothing in common [Derrida, by Glendinning]
21937 Can there be democratic friendship without us all becoming identical? [Derrida, by Glendinning]