Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Coherence Theory of Truth', 'The Basing Relation' and 'A Puzzle about Belief'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


12 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
There are reasons 'for which' a belief is held, reasons 'why' it is believed, and reasons 'to' believe it [Neta]
The basing relation of a reason to a belief should both support and explain the belief [Neta]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]