14 ideas
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
20713 | God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B] |