15 ideas
| 7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
| 9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
| 5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
| 9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
| 9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
| 5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
| 5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
| 9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
| 7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
| 7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
| 6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
| 9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
| 20713 | God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B] |