Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'God and Human Attributes', 'In a Critical Condition' and 'Liberalism: the basics'

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69 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
How do you count beliefs? [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor]
The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor]
Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor]
Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor]
Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor]
Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor]
Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor]
Modules make the world manageable [Fodor]
Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor]
Rationality rises above modules [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet]
Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet]
Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet]
Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / f. Multiculturalism
Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet]
Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet]
First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet]
Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet]
The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet]
From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet]
Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet]
The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]