Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'God and Human Attributes', 'Mental Content' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
23657 The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
23655 An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
23659 If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
23662 The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
23661 We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
23654 In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
23660 The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
23805 Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
23658 Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
23656 The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23806 Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
23793 On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
23796 Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
23792 Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
23795 Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
23804 Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
23802 Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
23797 Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
23799 Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
23800 Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
23798 Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
23653 If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
23663 There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
20713 God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]