Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'God and Human Attributes', 'The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge' and 'The Reasons of Love'

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49 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Kitcher says maths is an idealisation of the world, and our operations in dealing with it [Kitcher, by Resnik]
Mathematical a priorism is conceptualist, constructivist or realist [Kitcher]
The interest or beauty of mathematics is when it uses current knowledge to advance undestanding [Kitcher]
The 'beauty' or 'interest' of mathematics is just explanatory power [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers stand to measurement as natural numbers stand to counting [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / j. Complex numbers
Complex numbers were only accepted when a geometrical model for them was found [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
A one-operation is the segregation of a single object [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
The old view is that mathematics is useful in the world because it describes the world [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
With infinitesimals, you divide by the time, then set the time to zero [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Intuition is no basis for securing a priori knowledge, because it is fallible [Kitcher]
If mathematics comes through intuition, that is either inexplicable, or too subjective [Kitcher]
Mathematical intuition is not the type platonism needs [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Mathematical knowledge arises from basic perception [Kitcher]
My constructivism is mathematics as an idealization of collecting and ordering objects [Kitcher]
We derive limited mathematics from ordinary things, and erect powerful theories on their basis [Kitcher]
The defenders of complex numbers had to show that they could be expressed in physical terms [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Analyticity avoids abstract entities, but can there be truth without reference? [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Arithmetic is an idealizing theory [Kitcher]
Arithmetic is made true by the world, but is also made true by our constructions [Kitcher]
We develop a language for correlations, and use it to perform higher level operations [Kitcher]
Constructivism is ontological (that it is the work of an agent) and epistemological (knowable a priori) [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Conceptualists say we know mathematics a priori by possessing mathematical concepts [Kitcher]
If meaning makes mathematics true, you still need to say what the meanings refer to [Kitcher]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
Abstract objects were a bad way of explaining the structure in mathematics [Kitcher]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori knowledge comes from available a priori warrants that produce truth [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
In long mathematical proofs we can't remember the original a priori basis [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Knowledge is a priori if the experience giving you the concepts thus gives you the knowledge [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
We have some self-knowledge a priori, such as knowledge of our own existence [Kitcher]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence [Kitcher, by Casullo]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Idealisation trades off accuracy for simplicity, in varying degrees [Kitcher]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]