Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'God and Human Attributes', 'Naming and Necessity preface' and 'Our Knowledge of the External World'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell]
Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell]
Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
God must be fit for worship, but worship abandons morally autonomy, but there is no God [Rachels, by Davies,B]