Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'The Establishment of Scientific Semantics' and 'The Absurd'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
'"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski]
A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski]
Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel]