Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'Perception' and 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet'

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13 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
7630 Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
2602 What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
7632 Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
7635 Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7638 One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund]
7642 The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
7640 Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund]
7641 Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8840 There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8841 Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
7637 Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
2600 The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes]
2601 Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes]