Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'Putnam's Paradox' and 'Ontological Relativity'

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14 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
21642 If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
14212 A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
1633 Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
14213 Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
18964 Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14210 A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
18965 We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8840 There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8841 Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
1634 Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
8470 Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14215 Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
14209 Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
18963 Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine]