11 ideas
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
10197 | An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
10198 | If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW] |
10199 | Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |