Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory' and 'Anti-essentialism'

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW]
Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]