8 ideas
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
8886 | Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge [Gettier] |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |