Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'The Varieties of Reference' and 'Evidentialism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

11 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
12580 Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
7643 We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8840 There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19722 We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag]
19723 Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag]
19720 Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8841 Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
19721 Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23794 Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16366 The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12575 Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]