110 ideas
17016 | Philosophy must abstract from the senses [Newton] |
9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
18079 | Newton developed a kinematic approach to geometry [Newton, by Kitcher] |
18082 | Quantities and ratios which continually converge will eventually become equal [Newton] |
8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
17011 | I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton] |
8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
17028 | Particles mutually attract, and cohere at short distances [Newton] |
16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
17014 | The place of a thing is the sum of the places of its parts [Newton] |
8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
17546 | If you changed one of Newton's concepts you would destroy his whole system [Heisenberg on Newton] |
17027 | Science deduces propositions from phenomena, and generalises them by induction [Newton] |
17022 | We should admit only enough causes to explain a phenomenon, and no more [Newton] |
17021 | Natural effects of the same kind should be assumed to have the same causes [Newton] |
17026 | From the phenomena, I can't deduce the reason for the properties of gravity [Newton] |
8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
6421 | Newton's four fundamentals are: space, time, matter and force [Newton, by Russell] |
13470 | Mass is central to matter [Newton, by Hart,WD] |
17020 | An attraction of a body is the sum of the forces of their particles [Newton] |
23012 | Newtonian causation is changes of motion resulting from collisions [Newton, by Baron/Miller] |
8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
17008 | You have discovered that elliptical orbits result just from gravitation and planetary movement [Newton, by Leibniz] |
17010 | We have given up substantial forms, and now aim for mathematical laws [Newton] |
17023 | I am not saying gravity is essential to bodies [Newton] |
15866 | Newton reclassified vertical motion as violent, and unconstrained horizontal motion as natural [Newton, by Harré] |
15958 | Inertia rejects the Aristotelian idea of things having natural states, to which they return [Newton, by Alexander,P] |
20968 | Newton's Third Law implies the conservation of momentum [Newton, by Papineau] |
17017 | 1: Bodies rest, or move in straight lines, unless acted on by forces [Newton] |
17018 | 2: Change of motion is proportional to the force [Newton] |
17019 | 3: All actions of bodies have an equal and opposite reaction [Newton] |
17547 | Newton's idea of force acting over a long distance was very strange [Heisenberg on Newton] |
20966 | Newton introduced forces other than by contact [Newton, by Papineau] |
20967 | Newton's laws cover the effects of forces, but not their causes [Newton, by Papineau] |
16708 | Newton's forces were accused of being the scholastics' real qualities [Pasnau on Newton] |
13153 | I am studying the quantities and mathematics of forces, not their species or qualities [Newton] |
12724 | The aim is to discover forces from motions, and use forces to demonstrate other phenomena [Newton] |
13593 | Newton showed that falling to earth and orbiting the sun are essentially the same [Newton, by Ellis] |
20969 | Early Newtonians could not formulate conservation of energy, having no concept of potential energy [Newton, by Papineau] |
8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
17013 | Absolute space is independent, homogeneous and immovable [Newton] |
22915 | Newton needs intervals of time, to define velocity and acceleration [Newton, by Le Poidevin] |
22893 | Newton thought his laws of motion needed absolute time [Newton, by Bardon] |
17012 | Time exists independently, and flows uniformly [Newton] |
14012 | Absolute time, from its own nature, flows equably, without relation to anything external [Newton] |
22954 | Newtonian mechanics does not distinguish negative from positive values of time [Newton, by Coveney/Highfield] |
17015 | If there is no uniform motion, we cannot exactly measure time [Newton] |
17025 | If a perfect being does not rule the cosmos, it is not God [Newton] |
17024 | The elegance of the solar system requires a powerful intellect as designer [Newton] |