33 ideas
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |