21 ideas
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
10041 | Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel] |
21716 | In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B] |
10035 | Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel] |
10042 | Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel] |
10038 | A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel] |
10046 | The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel] |
10039 | Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel] |
10043 | Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel] |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
10045 | Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel] |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |