Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'works' and 'A Theory of Conditionals'

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10 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
17892 For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
9188 Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
10620 Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17883 Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17885 Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner]
10614 The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
14286 In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14285 A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8840 There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8841 Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]