26 ideas
6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
17867 | If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog] |
17877 | The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog] |
17872 | Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog] |
17871 | Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog] |
17866 | Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog] |
17868 | Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog] |
17870 | Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog] |
17869 | Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog] |
17876 | Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog] |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
17873 | Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog] |
6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |
17864 | Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog] |
17863 | Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog] |