36 ideas
11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
10794 | The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10786 | Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10788 | Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10799 | Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10790 | Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10791 | Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10785 | Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10795 | Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10798 | A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10787 | Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
10789 | Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)] |
10796 | If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
10797 | Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
8840 | There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve] |
8841 | Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve] |
11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |