Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why coherence is not enough', 'Prisoner's Dilemma' and 'Does moral phil rest on a mistake?'

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14 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
There are five possible responses to the problem of infinite regress in justification [Cleve]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Self-interest can fairly divide a cake; first person cuts, second person chooses [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
Formal game theory is about maximising or minimising numbers in tables [Poundstone]
The minimax theorem says a perfect game of opposed people always has a rational solution [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 7. Prisoner's Dilemma
Two prisoners get the best result by being loyal, not by selfish betrayal [Poundstone]
The tragedy in prisoner's dilemma is when two 'nice' players misread each other [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
TIT FOR TAT says cooperate at first, then do what the other player does [Poundstone]
Do unto others as you would have them do unto you - or else! [Poundstone]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard]