Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Elements of Mathematical Logic', 'A Priori' and 'Essence, Necessity and Explanation'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
17713 After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
15118 A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
15116 Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
8942 Lukasiewicz's L3 logic has three truth-values, T, F and I (for 'indeterminate') [Lukasiewicz, by Fisher]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17715 The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17716 Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
15110 An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15113 Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
15112 If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
17703 Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
17714 Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
17705 Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
17700 The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
15111 In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki]
15115 In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
17704 Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
15117 Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
15114 Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
17710 Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
17706 The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
17701 Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
17702 Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
17708 Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares]