Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ontological Categories', 'Dion and Theon: an essentialist solution' and 'Platonistic Theories of Universals'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
8964 Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
13134 We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
13124 Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff]
13117 How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff]
13116 Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff]
13118 Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff]
13125 Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff]
13126 Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff]
13130 Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
13131 The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
13123 All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
13115 Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff]
13119 Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff]
13135 A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
8962 'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
8961 Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
16235 Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
14753 The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
16072 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
14751 Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16071 Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman]
16234 Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley]
13278 Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
14750 Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
13129 Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
8963 Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]