32 ideas
17729 | Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins] |
17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |
13134 | We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff] |
17730 | Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins] |
17719 | Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins] |
17717 | Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins] |
17724 | It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins] |
22626 | Process philosophy insists that processes are not inferior in being to substances [Rescher] |
17727 | We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins] |
17720 | There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG] |
13124 | Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff] |
13117 | How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff] |
13116 | Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff] |
13118 | Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff] |
13125 | Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff] |
13126 | Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff] |
13130 | Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff] |
13131 | The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff] |
13123 | All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff] |
17728 | The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins] |
13115 | Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff] |
13119 | Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff] |
13135 | A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff] |
13129 | Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff] |
17726 | Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins] |
17734 | It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins] |
17723 | Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins] |
17739 | The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins] |
17718 | Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins] |
17731 | Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins] |
17732 | Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins] |
17725 | 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins] |