13 ideas
| 10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
| 10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
| 10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
| 8717 | Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) [Hilbert, by Friend] |
| 10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
| 10113 | The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' [Hilbert] |
| 10115 | Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
| 10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
| 10116 | Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions [Hilbert, by George/Velleman] |
| 3449 | If parallelism is true, how does the mind know about the body? [Crease] |
| 10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |