Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Principia Ethica' and 'The Causal Theory of Names'

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24 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9038 We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
5824 How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
9042 A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
9041 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
3449 If parallelism is true, how does the mind know about the body? [Crease]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
5825 Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
5823 The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
9039 If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
9043 We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
9040 Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
21233 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
8039 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
22151 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
11056 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
8033 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
8032 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
11050 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
23726 Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18676 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
11057 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5925 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5902 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
5903 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
5907 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]