14 ideas
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |