12 ideas
15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
18200 | Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
18199 | Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets [Putnam] |
8857 | We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence [Putnam] |
15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |