181 ideas
16281 | Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis] |
16288 | Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis] |
19807 | Both nature and reason require that everything has a cause [Rousseau] |
9651 | Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis] |
15731 | Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis] |
10470 | There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver] |
9650 | Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis] |
8909 | Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis] |
9057 | Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis] |
9671 | Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis] |
15751 | Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis] |
15735 | Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis] |
9656 | The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis] |
15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
15742 | A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis] |
15397 | If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
15398 | Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
15741 | All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis] |
15752 | We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis] |
14996 | Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis] |
15743 | Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis] |
15744 | We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis] |
15740 | I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis] |
16262 | Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin] |
15739 | There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis] |
10723 | A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver] |
9653 | It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis] |
15399 | The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron] |
15733 | Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis] |
15732 | Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis] |
15734 | If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis] |
9655 | Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis] |
16290 | I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis] |
9657 | You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis] |
15748 | Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis] |
15749 | Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis] |
15750 | Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis] |
15745 | Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis] |
15746 | If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis] |
15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
9667 | Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis] |
13268 | There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider] |
13793 | An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder] |
9663 | A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis] |
14737 | Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
9664 | Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis] |
9665 | There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis] |
19280 | I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis] |
15968 | Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis] |
15969 | Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis] |
9660 | The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis] |
9669 | There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis] |
16132 | On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis] |
16133 | Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis] |
12255 | For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis] |
9219 | Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider] |
16283 | For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis] |
15022 | If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis] |
10469 | A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis] |
16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
16284 | Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis] |
16286 | Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis] |
16287 | Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis] |
9662 | Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis] |
7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
14404 | The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks] |
5441 | Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis] |
5440 | A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner] |
16291 | In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis] |
11903 | Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P] |
15129 | Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis] |
9670 | Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis] |
16279 | General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis] |
9661 | Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis] |
9652 | To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis] |
9658 | An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis] |
16280 | Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis] |
16274 | If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis] |
8901 | Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis] |
8904 | The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis] |
8938 | The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis] |
8903 | Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis] |
8902 | If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis] |
8906 | If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis] |
8905 | If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis] |
8908 | For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis] |
8907 | The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis] |
16289 | We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis] |
16278 | A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis] |
9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
7235 | Without freedom of will actions lack moral significance [Rousseau] |
6040 | There is no universal goal to human life [Aenesidemus, by Photius] |
19791 | Natural mankind is too fragmented for states of peace, or of war and enmity [Rousseau] |
20501 | Rousseau assumes that laws need a people united by custom and tradition [Rousseau, by Wolff,J] |
7237 | The act of becoming 'a people' is the real foundation of society [Rousseau] |
19792 | To overcome obstacles, people must unite their forces into a single unified power [Rousseau] |
19812 | Human nature changes among a people, into a moral and partial existence [Rousseau] |
19814 | A state must be big enough to preserve itself, but small enough to be governable [Rousseau] |
19815 | Too much land is a struggle, producing defensive war; too little makes dependence, and offensive war [Rousseau] |
19822 | If the state enlarges, the creators of the general will become less individually powerful [Rousseau] |
19823 | If the population is larger, the government needs to be more powerful [Rousseau] |
7232 | Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains [Rousseau] |
7234 | No man has any natural authority over his fellows [Rousseau] |
19816 | A state's purpose is liberty and equality - liberty for strength, and equality for liberty [Rousseau] |
7247 | The greatest social good comes down to freedom and equality [Rousseau] |
19838 | The measure of a successful state is increase in its population [Rousseau] |
19848 | The sovereignty does not appoint the leaders [Rousseau] |
20567 | Rousseau insists that popular sovereignty needs a means of expressing consent [Rousseau, by Oksala] |
19801 | Sovereignty is the exercise of the general will, which can never be delegated [Rousseau] |
19805 | Just as people control their limbs, the general-will state has total control of its members [Rousseau] |
19818 | Political laws are fundamental, as they firmly organise the state - but they could still be changed [Rousseau] |
19790 | Force can only dominate if it is seen as a right, and obedience as a duty [Rousseau] |
7233 | The social order is a sacred right, but based on covenants, not nature [Rousseau] |
19842 | The government is instituted by a law, not by a contract [Rousseau] |
7239 | The social pact is the total subjection of individuals to the general will [Rousseau] |
19793 | We need a protective association which unites forces, but retains individual freedom [Rousseau] |
7240 | To foreign powers a state is seen as a simple individual [Rousseau] |
19795 | The act of association commits citizens to the state, and the state to its citizens [Rousseau] |
19796 | Individual citizens still retain a private will, which may be contrary to the general will [Rousseau] |
19797 | Citizens must ultimately for forced to accept the general will (so freedom is compulsory!) [Rousseau] |
7244 | The general will is common interest; the will of all is the sum of individual desires [Rousseau] |
19802 | The general will is always right, but the will of all can err, because it includes private interests [Rousseau] |
19803 | If the state contains associations there are fewer opinions, undermining the general will [Rousseau] |
19804 | If a large knowledgeable population votes in isolation, their many choices will have good results [Rousseau] |
19808 | The general will changes its nature when it focuses on particulars [Rousseau] |
7246 | The general will is always good, but sometimes misunderstood [Rousseau] |
7250 | Laws are authentic acts of the general will [Rousseau] |
19844 | Assemblies must always confirm the form of government, and the current administration [Rousseau] |
19846 | The more unanimous the assembly, the stronger the general will becomes [Rousseau] |
19817 | Citizens should be independent of each other, and very dependent on the state [Rousseau] |
19840 | A citizen is a subject who is also sovereign [Rousseau] |
19839 | The flourishing of arts and letters is too much admired [Rousseau] |
19798 | Ancient monarchs were kings of peoples; modern monarchs more cleverly rule a land [Rousseau] |
19831 | The highest officers under a monarchy are normally useless; the public could choose much better [Rousseau] |
19834 | Attempts to train future kings don't usually work, and the best have been unprepared [Rousseau] |
19833 | Hereditary monarchy is easier, but can lead to dreadful monarchs [Rousseau] |
19829 | Natural aristocracy is primitive, and hereditary is dreadful, but elective aristocracy is best [Rousseau] |
7249 | Natural aristocracy is primitive, hereditary is bad, and elective aristocracy is the best [Rousseau] |
19830 | Large states need a nobility to fill the gap between a single prince and the people [Rousseau] |
19827 | Law makers and law implementers should be separate [Rousseau] |
19820 | The state has a legislature and an executive, just like the will and physical power in a person [Rousseau] |
19821 | I call the executive power the 'government', which is the 'prince' - a single person, or a group [Rousseau] |
19824 | Large populations needs stronger control, which means power should be concentrated [Rousseau] |
19826 | Democracy for small states, aristocracy for intermediate, monarchy for large [Rousseau] |
19837 | If inhabitants are widely dispersed, organising a revolt is much more difficult [Rousseau] |
19843 | The state is not bound to leave civil authority to its leaders [Rousseau] |
19825 | If the sovereign entrusts government to at least half the citizens, that is 'democracy' [Rousseau] |
19832 | Democratic elections are dangerous intervals in government [Rousseau] |
7243 | Silence of the people implies their consent [Rousseau] |
7251 | The English are actually slaves in between elections [Rousseau] |
7238 | Minorities only accept majority-voting because of a prior unanimous agreement [Rousseau] |
19828 | Democracy leads to internal strife, as people struggle to maintain or change ways of ruling [Rousseau] |
19835 | When ministers change the state changes, because they always reverse policies [Rousseau] |
19849 | In early theocracies the god was the king, and there were as many gods as nations [Rousseau] |
19847 | We can never assume that the son of a slave is a slave [Rousseau] |
19841 | Sometimes full liberty is only possible at the expense of some complete enslavement [Rousseau] |
7242 | Appetite alone is slavery, and self-prescribed laws are freedom [Rousseau] |
19800 | The social compact imposes conventional equality of rights on people who may start unequally [Rousseau] |
7248 | No citizen should be rich enough to buy another, and none so poor as forced to sell himself [Rousseau] |
19794 | If we all give up all of our rights together to the community, we will always support one another [Rousseau] |
7241 | In society man loses natural liberty, but gains a right to civil liberty and property [Rousseau] |
19806 | We alienate to society only what society needs - but society judges that, not us [Rousseau] |
19799 | Private property must always be subordinate to ownership by the whole community [Rousseau] |
19819 | The state ensures liberty, so civil law separates citizens, and binds them to the state [Rousseau] |
7245 | Natural justice, without sanctions, benefits the wicked, who exploit it [Rousseau] |
19809 | We accept the death penalty to prevent assassinations, so we must submit to it if necessary [Rousseau] |
19810 | A trial proves that a criminal has broken the social treaty, and is no longer a member of the state [Rousseau] |
19811 | Only people who are actually dangerous should be executed, even as an example [Rousseau] |
7236 | War gives no right to inflict more destruction than is necessary for victory [Rousseau] |
23607 | Wars are between States, not people, and the individuals are enemies by accident [Rousseau] |
19850 | By separating theological and political systems, Jesus caused divisions in the state [Rousseau] |
19851 | Every society has a religion as its base [Rousseau] |
19852 | Civil religion needs one supreme god, an afterlife, justice, and the sanctity of the social contract [Rousseau] |
19853 | All religions should be tolerated, if they tolerate each other, and support citizenship [Rousseau] |
19836 | The amount of taxation doesn't matter, if it quickly circulates back to the citizens [Rousseau] |
9659 | Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis] |
9666 | It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis] |
7252 | A tyrant exploits Christians because they don't value this life, and are made to be slaves [Rousseau] |