Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Social Contract (tr Cress)', 'Pyrrhonian Arguments (frags)' and 'On the Plurality of Worlds'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


181 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Both nature and reason require that everything has a cause [Rousseau]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis]
Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis]
If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis]
Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis]
Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis]
We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis]
I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis]
Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis]
Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis]
Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis]
If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis]
There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis]
There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis]
Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis]
Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider]
For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis]
If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis]
A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis]
Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis]
Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks]
Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis]
A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner]
In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P]
Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis]
Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis]
Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 4. Abstracta by Example
The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 6. Abstracta by Conflation
Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis]
If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis]
If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis]
If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis]
The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis]
A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis]
Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without freedom of will actions lack moral significance [Rousseau]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
There is no universal goal to human life [Aenesidemus, by Photius]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Natural mankind is too fragmented for states of peace, or of war and enmity [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Rousseau assumes that laws need a people united by custom and tradition [Rousseau, by Wolff,J]
The act of becoming 'a people' is the real foundation of society [Rousseau]
To overcome obstacles, people must unite their forces into a single unified power [Rousseau]
Human nature changes among a people, into a moral and partial existence [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
A state must be big enough to preserve itself, but small enough to be governable [Rousseau]
Too much land is a struggle, producing defensive war; too little makes dependence, and offensive war [Rousseau]
If the state enlarges, the creators of the general will become less individually powerful [Rousseau]
If the population is larger, the government needs to be more powerful [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains [Rousseau]
No man has any natural authority over his fellows [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A state's purpose is liberty and equality - liberty for strength, and equality for liberty [Rousseau]
The greatest social good comes down to freedom and equality [Rousseau]
The measure of a successful state is increase in its population [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
The sovereignty does not appoint the leaders [Rousseau]
Rousseau insists that popular sovereignty needs a means of expressing consent [Rousseau, by Oksala]
Sovereignty is the exercise of the general will, which can never be delegated [Rousseau]
Just as people control their limbs, the general-will state has total control of its members [Rousseau]
Political laws are fundamental, as they firmly organise the state - but they could still be changed [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
Force can only dominate if it is seen as a right, and obedience as a duty [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The social order is a sacred right, but based on covenants, not nature [Rousseau]
The government is instituted by a law, not by a contract [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The social pact is the total subjection of individuals to the general will [Rousseau]
We need a protective association which unites forces, but retains individual freedom [Rousseau]
To foreign powers a state is seen as a simple individual [Rousseau]
The act of association commits citizens to the state, and the state to its citizens [Rousseau]
Individual citizens still retain a private will, which may be contrary to the general will [Rousseau]
Citizens must ultimately for forced to accept the general will (so freedom is compulsory!) [Rousseau]
The general will is common interest; the will of all is the sum of individual desires [Rousseau]
The general will is always right, but the will of all can err, because it includes private interests [Rousseau]
If the state contains associations there are fewer opinions, undermining the general will [Rousseau]
If a large knowledgeable population votes in isolation, their many choices will have good results [Rousseau]
The general will changes its nature when it focuses on particulars [Rousseau]
The general will is always good, but sometimes misunderstood [Rousseau]
Laws are authentic acts of the general will [Rousseau]
Assemblies must always confirm the form of government, and the current administration [Rousseau]
The more unanimous the assembly, the stronger the general will becomes [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Citizens should be independent of each other, and very dependent on the state [Rousseau]
A citizen is a subject who is also sovereign [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The flourishing of arts and letters is too much admired [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Ancient monarchs were kings of peoples; modern monarchs more cleverly rule a land [Rousseau]
The highest officers under a monarchy are normally useless; the public could choose much better [Rousseau]
Attempts to train future kings don't usually work, and the best have been unprepared [Rousseau]
Hereditary monarchy is easier, but can lead to dreadful monarchs [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Natural aristocracy is primitive, and hereditary is dreadful, but elective aristocracy is best [Rousseau]
Natural aristocracy is primitive, hereditary is bad, and elective aristocracy is the best [Rousseau]
Large states need a nobility to fill the gap between a single prince and the people [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Law makers and law implementers should be separate [Rousseau]
The state has a legislature and an executive, just like the will and physical power in a person [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
I call the executive power the 'government', which is the 'prince' - a single person, or a group [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / d. Size of government
Large populations needs stronger control, which means power should be concentrated [Rousseau]
Democracy for small states, aristocracy for intermediate, monarchy for large [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
If inhabitants are widely dispersed, organising a revolt is much more difficult [Rousseau]
The state is not bound to leave civil authority to its leaders [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
If the sovereign entrusts government to at least half the citizens, that is 'democracy' [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Democratic elections are dangerous intervals in government [Rousseau]
Silence of the people implies their consent [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
The English are actually slaves in between elections [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
Minorities only accept majority-voting because of a prior unanimous agreement [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy leads to internal strife, as people struggle to maintain or change ways of ruling [Rousseau]
When ministers change the state changes, because they always reverse policies [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
In early theocracies the god was the king, and there were as many gods as nations [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
We can never assume that the son of a slave is a slave [Rousseau]
Sometimes full liberty is only possible at the expense of some complete enslavement [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Appetite alone is slavery, and self-prescribed laws are freedom [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
The social compact imposes conventional equality of rights on people who may start unequally [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
No citizen should be rich enough to buy another, and none so poor as forced to sell himself [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
If we all give up all of our rights together to the community, we will always support one another [Rousseau]
In society man loses natural liberty, but gains a right to civil liberty and property [Rousseau]
We alienate to society only what society needs - but society judges that, not us [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Private property must always be subordinate to ownership by the whole community [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The state ensures liberty, so civil law separates citizens, and binds them to the state [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural justice, without sanctions, benefits the wicked, who exploit it [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
We accept the death penalty to prevent assassinations, so we must submit to it if necessary [Rousseau]
A trial proves that a criminal has broken the social treaty, and is no longer a member of the state [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / c. Deterrence of crime
Only people who are actually dangerous should be executed, even as an example [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
War gives no right to inflict more destruction than is necessary for victory [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
Wars are between States, not people, and the individuals are enemies by accident [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
By separating theological and political systems, Jesus caused divisions in the state [Rousseau]
Every society has a religion as its base [Rousseau]
Civil religion needs one supreme god, an afterlife, justice, and the sanctity of the social contract [Rousseau]
All religions should be tolerated, if they tolerate each other, and support citizenship [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
The amount of taxation doesn't matter, if it quickly circulates back to the citizens [Rousseau]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
A tyrant exploits Christians because they don't value this life, and are made to be slaves [Rousseau]