Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Social Contract (tr Cress)', 'Human Knowledge: its scope and limits' and 'Philosophy of Mind'

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158 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Both nature and reason require that everything has a cause [Rousseau]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim]
Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim]
Experiment requires mental causation [Kim]
Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain has no reference or content [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim]
Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim]
We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim]
What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim]
Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim]
Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim]
Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim]
Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim]
Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim]
Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim]
Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim]
Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim]
Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim]
The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim]
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim]
Content may match several things in the environment [Kim]
Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim]
Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim]
If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without freedom of will actions lack moral significance [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Natural mankind is too fragmented for states of peace, or of war and enmity [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Rousseau assumes that laws need a people united by custom and tradition [Rousseau, by Wolff,J]
The act of becoming 'a people' is the real foundation of society [Rousseau]
To overcome obstacles, people must unite their forces into a single unified power [Rousseau]
Human nature changes among a people, into a moral and partial existence [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
A state must be big enough to preserve itself, but small enough to be governable [Rousseau]
Too much land is a struggle, producing defensive war; too little makes dependence, and offensive war [Rousseau]
If the state enlarges, the creators of the general will become less individually powerful [Rousseau]
If the population is larger, the government needs to be more powerful [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains [Rousseau]
No man has any natural authority over his fellows [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A state's purpose is liberty and equality - liberty for strength, and equality for liberty [Rousseau]
The greatest social good comes down to freedom and equality [Rousseau]
The measure of a successful state is increase in its population [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
The sovereignty does not appoint the leaders [Rousseau]
Rousseau insists that popular sovereignty needs a means of expressing consent [Rousseau, by Oksala]
Sovereignty is the exercise of the general will, which can never be delegated [Rousseau]
Just as people control their limbs, the general-will state has total control of its members [Rousseau]
Political laws are fundamental, as they firmly organise the state - but they could still be changed [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
Force can only dominate if it is seen as a right, and obedience as a duty [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The social order is a sacred right, but based on covenants, not nature [Rousseau]
The government is instituted by a law, not by a contract [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The social pact is the total subjection of individuals to the general will [Rousseau]
We need a protective association which unites forces, but retains individual freedom [Rousseau]
To foreign powers a state is seen as a simple individual [Rousseau]
The act of association commits citizens to the state, and the state to its citizens [Rousseau]
Individual citizens still retain a private will, which may be contrary to the general will [Rousseau]
Citizens must ultimately for forced to accept the general will (so freedom is compulsory!) [Rousseau]
The general will is common interest; the will of all is the sum of individual desires [Rousseau]
The general will is always right, but the will of all can err, because it includes private interests [Rousseau]
If the state contains associations there are fewer opinions, undermining the general will [Rousseau]
If a large knowledgeable population votes in isolation, their many choices will have good results [Rousseau]
The general will changes its nature when it focuses on particulars [Rousseau]
The general will is always good, but sometimes misunderstood [Rousseau]
Laws are authentic acts of the general will [Rousseau]
Assemblies must always confirm the form of government, and the current administration [Rousseau]
The more unanimous the assembly, the stronger the general will becomes [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Citizens should be independent of each other, and very dependent on the state [Rousseau]
A citizen is a subject who is also sovereign [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The flourishing of arts and letters is too much admired [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Ancient monarchs were kings of peoples; modern monarchs more cleverly rule a land [Rousseau]
The highest officers under a monarchy are normally useless; the public could choose much better [Rousseau]
Attempts to train future kings don't usually work, and the best have been unprepared [Rousseau]
Hereditary monarchy is easier, but can lead to dreadful monarchs [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Natural aristocracy is primitive, and hereditary is dreadful, but elective aristocracy is best [Rousseau]
Natural aristocracy is primitive, hereditary is bad, and elective aristocracy is the best [Rousseau]
Large states need a nobility to fill the gap between a single prince and the people [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Law makers and law implementers should be separate [Rousseau]
The state has a legislature and an executive, just like the will and physical power in a person [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
I call the executive power the 'government', which is the 'prince' - a single person, or a group [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / d. Size of government
Large populations needs stronger control, which means power should be concentrated [Rousseau]
Democracy for small states, aristocracy for intermediate, monarchy for large [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
If inhabitants are widely dispersed, organising a revolt is much more difficult [Rousseau]
The state is not bound to leave civil authority to its leaders [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
If the sovereign entrusts government to at least half the citizens, that is 'democracy' [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Democratic elections are dangerous intervals in government [Rousseau]
Silence of the people implies their consent [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
The English are actually slaves in between elections [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
Minorities only accept majority-voting because of a prior unanimous agreement [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy leads to internal strife, as people struggle to maintain or change ways of ruling [Rousseau]
When ministers change the state changes, because they always reverse policies [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
In early theocracies the god was the king, and there were as many gods as nations [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
We can never assume that the son of a slave is a slave [Rousseau]
Sometimes full liberty is only possible at the expense of some complete enslavement [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Appetite alone is slavery, and self-prescribed laws are freedom [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
The social compact imposes conventional equality of rights on people who may start unequally [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
No citizen should be rich enough to buy another, and none so poor as forced to sell himself [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
If we all give up all of our rights together to the community, we will always support one another [Rousseau]
In society man loses natural liberty, but gains a right to civil liberty and property [Rousseau]
We alienate to society only what society needs - but society judges that, not us [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Private property must always be subordinate to ownership by the whole community [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The state ensures liberty, so civil law separates citizens, and binds them to the state [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural justice, without sanctions, benefits the wicked, who exploit it [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
We accept the death penalty to prevent assassinations, so we must submit to it if necessary [Rousseau]
A trial proves that a criminal has broken the social treaty, and is no longer a member of the state [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / c. Deterrence of crime
Only people who are actually dangerous should be executed, even as an example [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
War gives no right to inflict more destruction than is necessary for victory [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
Wars are between States, not people, and the individuals are enemies by accident [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
By separating theological and political systems, Jesus caused divisions in the state [Rousseau]
Every society has a religion as its base [Rousseau]
Civil religion needs one supreme god, an afterlife, justice, and the sanctity of the social contract [Rousseau]
All religions should be tolerated, if they tolerate each other, and support citizenship [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
The amount of taxation doesn't matter, if it quickly circulates back to the citizens [Rousseau]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
A tyrant exploits Christians because they don't value this life, and are made to be slaves [Rousseau]