Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Social Contract (tr Cress)', 'The Ultimate Constituents of Matter' and 'Naming and Necessity lectures'

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185 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Both nature and reason require that everything has a cause [Rousseau]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke]
A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins]
Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G]
Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke]
Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke]
If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos]
Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady]
A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers]
"'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke]
Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke]
Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke]
Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke]
A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke]
Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan]
Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette]
Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam]
If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke]
A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke]
It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe]
Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke]
A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames]
Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell]
Sense-data are purely physical [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau]
Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey]
Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP]
Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]
Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn]
Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam]
We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG]
It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without freedom of will actions lack moral significance [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Natural mankind is too fragmented for states of peace, or of war and enmity [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Rousseau assumes that laws need a people united by custom and tradition [Rousseau, by Wolff,J]
The act of becoming 'a people' is the real foundation of society [Rousseau]
To overcome obstacles, people must unite their forces into a single unified power [Rousseau]
Human nature changes among a people, into a moral and partial existence [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
A state must be big enough to preserve itself, but small enough to be governable [Rousseau]
Too much land is a struggle, producing defensive war; too little makes dependence, and offensive war [Rousseau]
If the state enlarges, the creators of the general will become less individually powerful [Rousseau]
If the population is larger, the government needs to be more powerful [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains [Rousseau]
No man has any natural authority over his fellows [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A state's purpose is liberty and equality - liberty for strength, and equality for liberty [Rousseau]
The greatest social good comes down to freedom and equality [Rousseau]
The measure of a successful state is increase in its population [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
The sovereignty does not appoint the leaders [Rousseau]
Rousseau insists that popular sovereignty needs a means of expressing consent [Rousseau, by Oksala]
Sovereignty is the exercise of the general will, which can never be delegated [Rousseau]
Just as people control their limbs, the general-will state has total control of its members [Rousseau]
Political laws are fundamental, as they firmly organise the state - but they could still be changed [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
Force can only dominate if it is seen as a right, and obedience as a duty [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The social order is a sacred right, but based on covenants, not nature [Rousseau]
The government is instituted by a law, not by a contract [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The social pact is the total subjection of individuals to the general will [Rousseau]
We need a protective association which unites forces, but retains individual freedom [Rousseau]
To foreign powers a state is seen as a simple individual [Rousseau]
The act of association commits citizens to the state, and the state to its citizens [Rousseau]
Individual citizens still retain a private will, which may be contrary to the general will [Rousseau]
Citizens must ultimately for forced to accept the general will (so freedom is compulsory!) [Rousseau]
The general will is common interest; the will of all is the sum of individual desires [Rousseau]
The general will is always right, but the will of all can err, because it includes private interests [Rousseau]
If the state contains associations there are fewer opinions, undermining the general will [Rousseau]
If a large knowledgeable population votes in isolation, their many choices will have good results [Rousseau]
The general will changes its nature when it focuses on particulars [Rousseau]
The general will is always good, but sometimes misunderstood [Rousseau]
Laws are authentic acts of the general will [Rousseau]
Assemblies must always confirm the form of government, and the current administration [Rousseau]
The more unanimous the assembly, the stronger the general will becomes [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Citizens should be independent of each other, and very dependent on the state [Rousseau]
A citizen is a subject who is also sovereign [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
The flourishing of arts and letters is too much admired [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Ancient monarchs were kings of peoples; modern monarchs more cleverly rule a land [Rousseau]
The highest officers under a monarchy are normally useless; the public could choose much better [Rousseau]
Attempts to train future kings don't usually work, and the best have been unprepared [Rousseau]
Hereditary monarchy is easier, but can lead to dreadful monarchs [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Natural aristocracy is primitive, and hereditary is dreadful, but elective aristocracy is best [Rousseau]
Natural aristocracy is primitive, hereditary is bad, and elective aristocracy is the best [Rousseau]
Large states need a nobility to fill the gap between a single prince and the people [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Law makers and law implementers should be separate [Rousseau]
The state has a legislature and an executive, just like the will and physical power in a person [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
I call the executive power the 'government', which is the 'prince' - a single person, or a group [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / d. Size of government
Large populations needs stronger control, which means power should be concentrated [Rousseau]
Democracy for small states, aristocracy for intermediate, monarchy for large [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
If inhabitants are widely dispersed, organising a revolt is much more difficult [Rousseau]
The state is not bound to leave civil authority to its leaders [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
If the sovereign entrusts government to at least half the citizens, that is 'democracy' [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Democratic elections are dangerous intervals in government [Rousseau]
Silence of the people implies their consent [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
The English are actually slaves in between elections [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
Minorities only accept majority-voting because of a prior unanimous agreement [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy leads to internal strife, as people struggle to maintain or change ways of ruling [Rousseau]
When ministers change the state changes, because they always reverse policies [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 10. Theocracy
In early theocracies the god was the king, and there were as many gods as nations [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
We can never assume that the son of a slave is a slave [Rousseau]
Sometimes full liberty is only possible at the expense of some complete enslavement [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Appetite alone is slavery, and self-prescribed laws are freedom [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
The social compact imposes conventional equality of rights on people who may start unequally [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
No citizen should be rich enough to buy another, and none so poor as forced to sell himself [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
If we all give up all of our rights together to the community, we will always support one another [Rousseau]
In society man loses natural liberty, but gains a right to civil liberty and property [Rousseau]
We alienate to society only what society needs - but society judges that, not us [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Private property must always be subordinate to ownership by the whole community [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The state ensures liberty, so civil law separates citizens, and binds them to the state [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural justice, without sanctions, benefits the wicked, who exploit it [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
We accept the death penalty to prevent assassinations, so we must submit to it if necessary [Rousseau]
A trial proves that a criminal has broken the social treaty, and is no longer a member of the state [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / c. Deterrence of crime
Only people who are actually dangerous should be executed, even as an example [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
War gives no right to inflict more destruction than is necessary for victory [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
Wars are between States, not people, and the individuals are enemies by accident [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
By separating theological and political systems, Jesus caused divisions in the state [Rousseau]
Every society has a religion as its base [Rousseau]
Civil religion needs one supreme god, an afterlife, justice, and the sanctity of the social contract [Rousseau]
All religions should be tolerated, if they tolerate each other, and support citizenship [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
The amount of taxation doesn't matter, if it quickly circulates back to the citizens [Rousseau]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke]
Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke]
'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke]
Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke]
Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell]
Matter is a logical construction [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke]
'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke]
The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
A tyrant exploits Christians because they don't value this life, and are made to be slaves [Rousseau]