237 ideas
4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
12997 | Analysis is the art of finding the middle term [Leibniz] |
4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
13009 | A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz] |
12963 | Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths [Leibniz] |
19360 | General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking [Leibniz] |
19807 | Both nature and reason require that everything has a cause [Rousseau] |
4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
12983 | A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure [Leibniz] |
12976 | If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz] |
12984 | Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz] |
12982 | One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz] |
12980 | Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational' [Leibniz] |
13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
12992 | Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts [Leibniz] |
10056 | At bottom eternal truths are all conditional [Leibniz] |
12974 | People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz] |
13002 | It is always good to reduce the number of axioms [Leibniz] |
4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
13008 | Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity [Leibniz] |
12956 | Only whole numbers are multitudes of units [Leibniz] |
12937 | We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them [Leibniz] |
4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
12932 | The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz] |
4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
12966 | Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz] |
12993 | Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz] |
4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
12989 | Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz] |
4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
12959 | We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers [Leibniz] |
12967 | I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude [Leibniz] |
12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
5056 | Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz] |
12969 | The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities' [Leibniz] |
12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
12990 | Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents [Leibniz] |
12939 | Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions [Leibniz] |
12979 | The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them [Leibniz] |
12971 | If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation [Leibniz] |
13098 | We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa [Leibniz] |
13075 | No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction [Leibniz] |
12953 | Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs [Leibniz] |
4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
12943 | Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future [Leibniz] |
11855 | Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence [Leibniz] |
4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
12970 | We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to [Leibniz] |
12986 | The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz] |
12968 | A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates [Leibniz] |
12931 | Particular truths are just instances of general truths [Leibniz] |
12811 | We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality [Leibniz] |
12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
5057 | If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first [Leibniz] |
12987 | For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member [Leibniz] |
12884 | The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost [Leibniz] |
12975 | We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it [Leibniz] |
12805 | If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things [Leibniz] |
12806 | Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Leibniz, by Jolley] |
4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
12972 | Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same [Leibniz] |
4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
5055 | No two things are totally identical [Leibniz] |
4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
12978 | A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz] |
17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
12998 | Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas [Leibniz] |
12960 | We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them [Leibniz] |
13006 | Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz] |
12996 | I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C [Leibniz] |
13003 | The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am' [Leibniz] |
21253 | Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions [Leibniz] |
12933 | Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation [Leibniz] |
12991 | Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions [Leibniz] |
12929 | All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses [Leibniz] |
12940 | What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas? [Leibniz] |
19358 | Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance [Leibniz] |
12948 | A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz] |
13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
12947 | We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses [Leibniz] |
4302 | You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true [Leibniz] |
12930 | The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas [Leibniz] |
13001 | Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement [Leibniz] |
12949 | Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist [Leibniz] |
4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
5053 | The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity [Leibniz] |
4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
12977 | We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply [Leibniz] |
5054 | Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination [Leibniz] |
12944 | It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions [Leibniz] |
12951 | Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths [Leibniz] |
19364 | Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad) [Leibniz] |
12942 | Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man [Leibniz] |
12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
12935 | Every feeling is the perception of a truth [Leibniz] |
12938 | An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things [Leibniz] |
12945 | Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts [Leibniz] |
12950 | We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas [Leibniz] |
19357 | The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow [Leibniz] |
12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
12946 | The idea of the will includes the understanding [Leibniz] |
12964 | If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons [Leibniz] |
7235 | Without freedom of will actions lack moral significance [Rousseau] |
12958 | Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object [Leibniz] |
12957 | The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful [Leibniz] |
12962 | Pleasure is a sense of perfection [Leibniz] |
12934 | We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed [Leibniz] |
19791 | Natural mankind is too fragmented for states of peace, or of war and enmity [Rousseau] |
20501 | Rousseau assumes that laws need a people united by custom and tradition [Rousseau, by Wolff,J] |
7237 | The act of becoming 'a people' is the real foundation of society [Rousseau] |
19792 | To overcome obstacles, people must unite their forces into a single unified power [Rousseau] |
19812 | Human nature changes among a people, into a moral and partial existence [Rousseau] |
19814 | A state must be big enough to preserve itself, but small enough to be governable [Rousseau] |
19815 | Too much land is a struggle, producing defensive war; too little makes dependence, and offensive war [Rousseau] |
19822 | If the state enlarges, the creators of the general will become less individually powerful [Rousseau] |
19823 | If the population is larger, the government needs to be more powerful [Rousseau] |
7232 | Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains [Rousseau] |
7234 | No man has any natural authority over his fellows [Rousseau] |
19816 | A state's purpose is liberty and equality - liberty for strength, and equality for liberty [Rousseau] |
7247 | The greatest social good comes down to freedom and equality [Rousseau] |
19838 | The measure of a successful state is increase in its population [Rousseau] |
19848 | The sovereignty does not appoint the leaders [Rousseau] |
20567 | Rousseau insists that popular sovereignty needs a means of expressing consent [Rousseau, by Oksala] |
19801 | Sovereignty is the exercise of the general will, which can never be delegated [Rousseau] |
19805 | Just as people control their limbs, the general-will state has total control of its members [Rousseau] |
19818 | Political laws are fundamental, as they firmly organise the state - but they could still be changed [Rousseau] |
19790 | Force can only dominate if it is seen as a right, and obedience as a duty [Rousseau] |
7233 | The social order is a sacred right, but based on covenants, not nature [Rousseau] |
19842 | The government is instituted by a law, not by a contract [Rousseau] |
7239 | The social pact is the total subjection of individuals to the general will [Rousseau] |
19793 | We need a protective association which unites forces, but retains individual freedom [Rousseau] |
7240 | To foreign powers a state is seen as a simple individual [Rousseau] |
19795 | The act of association commits citizens to the state, and the state to its citizens [Rousseau] |
19796 | Individual citizens still retain a private will, which may be contrary to the general will [Rousseau] |
19797 | Citizens must ultimately for forced to accept the general will (so freedom is compulsory!) [Rousseau] |
7244 | The general will is common interest; the will of all is the sum of individual desires [Rousseau] |
19802 | The general will is always right, but the will of all can err, because it includes private interests [Rousseau] |
19803 | If the state contains associations there are fewer opinions, undermining the general will [Rousseau] |
19804 | If a large knowledgeable population votes in isolation, their many choices will have good results [Rousseau] |
19808 | The general will changes its nature when it focuses on particulars [Rousseau] |
7246 | The general will is always good, but sometimes misunderstood [Rousseau] |
7250 | Laws are authentic acts of the general will [Rousseau] |
19844 | Assemblies must always confirm the form of government, and the current administration [Rousseau] |
19846 | The more unanimous the assembly, the stronger the general will becomes [Rousseau] |
19817 | Citizens should be independent of each other, and very dependent on the state [Rousseau] |
19840 | A citizen is a subject who is also sovereign [Rousseau] |
19839 | The flourishing of arts and letters is too much admired [Rousseau] |
19798 | Ancient monarchs were kings of peoples; modern monarchs more cleverly rule a land [Rousseau] |
19831 | The highest officers under a monarchy are normally useless; the public could choose much better [Rousseau] |
19834 | Attempts to train future kings don't usually work, and the best have been unprepared [Rousseau] |
19833 | Hereditary monarchy is easier, but can lead to dreadful monarchs [Rousseau] |
19829 | Natural aristocracy is primitive, and hereditary is dreadful, but elective aristocracy is best [Rousseau] |
7249 | Natural aristocracy is primitive, hereditary is bad, and elective aristocracy is the best [Rousseau] |
19830 | Large states need a nobility to fill the gap between a single prince and the people [Rousseau] |
19827 | Law makers and law implementers should be separate [Rousseau] |
19820 | The state has a legislature and an executive, just like the will and physical power in a person [Rousseau] |
19821 | I call the executive power the 'government', which is the 'prince' - a single person, or a group [Rousseau] |
19824 | Large populations needs stronger control, which means power should be concentrated [Rousseau] |
19826 | Democracy for small states, aristocracy for intermediate, monarchy for large [Rousseau] |
19837 | If inhabitants are widely dispersed, organising a revolt is much more difficult [Rousseau] |
19843 | The state is not bound to leave civil authority to its leaders [Rousseau] |
19825 | If the sovereign entrusts government to at least half the citizens, that is 'democracy' [Rousseau] |
19832 | Democratic elections are dangerous intervals in government [Rousseau] |
7243 | Silence of the people implies their consent [Rousseau] |
7251 | The English are actually slaves in between elections [Rousseau] |
7238 | Minorities only accept majority-voting because of a prior unanimous agreement [Rousseau] |
19828 | Democracy leads to internal strife, as people struggle to maintain or change ways of ruling [Rousseau] |
19835 | When ministers change the state changes, because they always reverse policies [Rousseau] |
19849 | In early theocracies the god was the king, and there were as many gods as nations [Rousseau] |
19847 | We can never assume that the son of a slave is a slave [Rousseau] |
19841 | Sometimes full liberty is only possible at the expense of some complete enslavement [Rousseau] |
7242 | Appetite alone is slavery, and self-prescribed laws are freedom [Rousseau] |
19800 | The social compact imposes conventional equality of rights on people who may start unequally [Rousseau] |
7248 | No citizen should be rich enough to buy another, and none so poor as forced to sell himself [Rousseau] |
19794 | If we all give up all of our rights together to the community, we will always support one another [Rousseau] |
7241 | In society man loses natural liberty, but gains a right to civil liberty and property [Rousseau] |
19806 | We alienate to society only what society needs - but society judges that, not us [Rousseau] |
19799 | Private property must always be subordinate to ownership by the whole community [Rousseau] |
19819 | The state ensures liberty, so civil law separates citizens, and binds them to the state [Rousseau] |
7245 | Natural justice, without sanctions, benefits the wicked, who exploit it [Rousseau] |
19809 | We accept the death penalty to prevent assassinations, so we must submit to it if necessary [Rousseau] |
19810 | A trial proves that a criminal has broken the social treaty, and is no longer a member of the state [Rousseau] |
12936 | There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence [Leibniz] |
19811 | Only people who are actually dangerous should be executed, even as an example [Rousseau] |
7236 | War gives no right to inflict more destruction than is necessary for victory [Rousseau] |
23607 | Wars are between States, not people, and the individuals are enemies by accident [Rousseau] |
19850 | By separating theological and political systems, Jesus caused divisions in the state [Rousseau] |
19851 | Every society has a religion as its base [Rousseau] |
19852 | Civil religion needs one supreme god, an afterlife, justice, and the sanctity of the social contract [Rousseau] |
19853 | All religions should be tolerated, if they tolerate each other, and support citizenship [Rousseau] |
19836 | The amount of taxation doesn't matter, if it quickly circulates back to the citizens [Rousseau] |
4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
11856 | Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject [Leibniz] |
12994 | Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties [Leibniz] |
12808 | Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail [Leibniz] |
4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
12985 | Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place' [Leibniz] |
4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
12952 | Space is an order among actual and possible things [Leibniz] |
4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
12955 | If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length [Leibniz] |
12954 | God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents [Leibniz] |
12988 | The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony [Leibniz] |
1414 | A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit [Leibniz] |
21252 | Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved [Leibniz] |
19328 | Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated [Leibniz] |
7252 | A tyrant exploits Christians because they don't value this life, and are made to be slaves [Rousseau] |
5058 | Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls [Leibniz] |