Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Being and Nothingness', 'Principia Ethica' and 'The Conscious Mind'

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77 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers]
Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers]
Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers]
What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers]
Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers]
Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers]
Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford]
Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE]
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE]
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE]
Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Man is a useless passion [Sartre]
Man is the desire to be God [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho]
We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers]