37 ideas
18365 | If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David] |
18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
18358 | Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David] |
18355 | What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David] |
18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
18354 | Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David] |
18356 | Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David] |
18363 | Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David] |
18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
18364 | Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David] |
18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
22227 | For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle] |
18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
18361 | A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David] |
18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
20743 | Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre] |
6151 | Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
6164 | Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
7074 | Man is a useless passion [Sartre] |
6687 | Man is the desire to be God [Sartre] |
22228 | Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle] |
22233 | Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre] |
20755 | Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre] |
20760 | Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho] |
22231 | We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre] |