79 ideas
| 8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
| 18019 | People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor] |
| 17998 | Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor] |
| 18012 | Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor] |
| 18013 | Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor] |
| 18011 | Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor] |
| 18016 | Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor] |
| 18015 | The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor] |
| 18017 | If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor] |
| 18021 | Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor] |
| 18030 | A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor] |
| 18031 | If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor] |
| 18032 | Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor] |
| 18034 | Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor] |
| 18037 | Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor] |
| 18039 | If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor] |
| 18041 | Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor] |
| 18055 | In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor] |
| 18056 | Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor] |
| 18057 | 'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor] |
| 18058 | Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor] |
| 18059 | The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor] |
| 8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
| 8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
| 18040 | Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor] |
| 8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
| 8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
| 17997 | Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor] |
| 8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
| 18060 | We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor] |
| 8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
| 8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
| 8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
| 8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
| 8143 | Self is the rider, intellect the charioteer, mind the reins, and body the chariot [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8147 | We have an apparent and a true self; only the second one exists, and we must seek to know it [Anon (Upan)] |
| 18020 | Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor] |
| 18035 | Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor] |
| 18018 | To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor] |
| 8155 | Without speech we cannot know right/wrong, true/false, good/bad, or pleasant/unpleasant [Anon (Upan)] |
| 18008 | Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor] |
| 18010 | 'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor] |
| 18053 | The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor] |
| 17999 | Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor] |
| 18000 | Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor] |
| 18014 | Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor] |
| 18001 | Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor] |
| 18036 | A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor] |
| 18051 | In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor] |
| 18043 | The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor] |
| 18042 | The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor] |
| 18047 | A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor] |
| 18048 | A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor] |
| 18049 | The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor] |
| 18050 | If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor] |
| 18054 | Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor] |
| 18028 | Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor] |
| 18029 | Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor] |
| 18022 | Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor] |
| 18024 | One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor] |
| 18023 | Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor] |
| 18025 | The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor] |
| 18026 | Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor] |
| 18027 | Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor] |
| 8142 | The wise prefer good to pleasure; the foolish are drawn to pleasure by desire [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8151 | Let your teacher be a god to you [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8153 | By knowing one piece of clay or gold, you know all of clay or gold [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8154 | Originally there must have been just Existence, which could not come from non-existence [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8148 | Brahma, supreme god and protector of the universe, arose from the ocean of existence [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8144 | Brahman is the Uncaused Cause [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8152 | Earth, food, fire, sun are all forms of Brahman [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8159 | Damayata - be self-controlled! Datta - be charitable! Dayadhwam - be compassionate! [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8156 | The gods are not worshipped for their own sake, but for the sake of the Self [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8157 | A man with desires is continually reborn, until his desires are stilled [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8145 | Those ignorant of Atman return as animals or plants, according to their merits [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8149 | Charity and ritual observance distract from the highest good of religion [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8158 | Do not seek to know Brahman by arguments, for arguments are idle and vain [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8146 | The immortal in us is the part that never sleeps, and shapes our dreams [Anon (Upan)] |
| 8150 | The immortal Self and the sad individual self are like two golden birds perched on one tree [Anon (Upan)] |