Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'The Philosophy of Leibniz' and 'Putnam's Paradox'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis

7529	All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions [Russell]

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

8952	We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic

8943	Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic

8945	Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic

8951	Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic

8950	Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms

14212

A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism

14213

Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness

8946	We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

8944	Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts

14210

A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

8941	We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals

8947	If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals

8949	In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

14215

Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]

19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description

14209

Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]