Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'Abstract Objects' and 'Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance'

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34 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale]
Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale]
Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale]
If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale]
Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale]
Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale]
The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale]
If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale]
It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale]
Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale]
If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale]
Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis]